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The growing literature on diasporas’ involvement in homeland conflicts shows that 
diasporas have the power to influence political, social and economic developments in 
their country of origin and residence. Although this is an emerging field of research, 
there is still much to discover about the roles that diasporas play in conflict 
resolution and transitional justice mechanisms. This article intends to fill this gap by 
scrutinizing the Kurdish Diaspora as a case study. Based on in-depth interviews with 
Kurdish diaspora and extensive fieldwork observations in Europe between 2008 and 
2015, it explores the intricacies of integrating diasporas into conflict resolution by 
analyzing approaches of homeland actors and fragments within Kurdish diaspora 
groups throughout the different stages of the peace processes.  
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Introduction 
Scholars from various disciplines within the social sciences point out that diasporas 
cannot be ignored when discussing contemporary conflicts (Cohen, 1997; Smith, 2007; 
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Cochrane, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Van Hear, 1998; Kleist, 2007; Pirkkalainen and 
Abdile, 2009; Féron, 2017). The growing literature on diaspora involvement in 
homeland conflicts show that diasporas have the power to influence political, social and 
economic developments in their country of origin and residence. They develop multiple 
loyalties, become engaged both with home and host country political affairs and 
function well in both realms (Van Hear, 1998; Vorrath, 2012). Many diasporas are 
associated with political activism, and a considerable number of them are actually the 
result of conflicts around the world. They “mobilize financial, diplomatic, social, 
cultural and religious capital in the service of conflicts in the ostensible homeland” 
(Fair, 2005, p.147).  Although there is an emerging field of research on this topic, there 
is still much to discover about what role diasporas play in conflict resolution. The rise 
of diaspora politics, as Lyons and Mandaville (2010) put it, poses a challenge to our 
traditional understanding of foreign policy-making that puts emphasis solely on state-
state relations, IGOs or NGOs. This article argues that it also poses a challenge to our 
traditional understanding of peace-building and transitional justice. If we want to 
comprehend the mechanisms of contemporary conflict resolution in today’s world, 
engaging these populations must be a vital dimension to overarching peace-building 
strategies (Tint et al., 2014, p. 8; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2016, p.23). However, as peace 
processes are difficult tasks especially when it comes to determining inclusion and 
exclusion of actors, engaging diasporas as non-state actors to negotiation frameworks 
becomes all the more complex. Especially considering that the idea of inclusion has not 
found a consensus in peace studies just yet (see Suazo, 2013), engaging diasporas in 
these processes also brings about novel discussions into the field.  
The Kurdish case is exemplary when it comes to diaspora influence and engagement. 
The conflict in Turkey continues to be subject to considerable diaspora influence and 
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this merits further attention. Turkey has been experiencing a low-intensity civil war 
since the 1980s. Since then, there have been various ceasefires and, finally, an attempt 
at peaceful resolution. The peace process between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party) and the Turkish state collapsed in the summer of 2015 with the eruption of 
armed clashes between the conflicting parties. During the course of the conflict, the 
Kurdish diaspora in Europe played a crucial role in terms of forming advocacy 
networks worldwide, raising awareness of the Kurdish cause, protesting and preparing 
petitions in order to make the voice of oppressed Kurds in Turkey heard in their 
hostlands. The diaspora even founded a short-lived government in exile in Brussels. 
They worked as lobby groups at local, national, and supranational levels and they 
transnationalized the Kurdish Question (see van Bruinessen, 2000; Eccarius-Kelly, 
2002; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Baser 2015). Therefore, it was not surprising that the 
diaspora also tried to have a say at the peace talks both directly and indirectly. The 
Kurdish diaspora aimed to complement the efforts of homeland actors who were in 
favor of an immediate peaceful resolution.  But did they truly have the power to exert 
influence over such a complicated process? Did they act as spoilers or supporters in 
the conflict? No systematic or quantitative academic research has been conducted on 
how the diaspora perceived the process to this date. It is the objective of this article to 
exposit the involvement of the Kurdish diaspora in the failed peace process in Turkey 
in order to demonstrate the complexities and challenges of involving diasporas in 
conflict resolution.  
Against this background, the article initially presents a review of the existing 
literature on diaspora involvement in conflict resolution by giving examples from a 
variety of cases. After presenting the theoretical framework on diaspora engagement 
in conflict resolution, reconciliation and transitional justice, the focus shifts to the 
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Kurdish diaspora. The role that the Kurdish diaspora played during different phases of 
the conflict and the heterogeneous structure of the Kurdish Diaspora are analyzed by 
looking at different groups with varying repertoires of action and political agendas. 
The arguments are based author’s interviews with Kurdish diaspora members and 
fieldwork observations in various European countries during the peace process in 
Turkey, which is explained in details in the methodology section below.  
 
Diaspora Engagement in Peace and Conflict 
Inclusion and exclusion of relevant actors in peace processes and transitional justice is 
still an on-going debate. As Paffenholz (2014, p.4) argues “the key question in 
designing peace processes is to decide who should participate in which phase, role and 
format in order to reach a quality and sustainable agreement”. Authors such as Suazo 
(2013, p.5-6) and Paffenholz (2014, p.4-9) have discussed whether long-term inclusion 
of various parties in conflict can increase trust levels, decrease the possibilities of 
spoiling, enhance legitimacy and representation, and thus paves the way for more 
sustainable solutions when it comes to peacebuilding. Following Stedman (1997), 
Suazo (2013, p.6-8) also argues that a high level numerical inclusion of many parties 
will lead to a higher likelihood of peace and allows different actors to consolidate their 
interests during negotiations. Other authors such as Wanis-St.John (2008, p.4) also 
discuss the role that civil society can play in peace processes and peacebuilding arguing 
that the discussions generally underplay the difficulties of inclusion while normatively 
advocating participation.  
As Paffenholz (2014, p.4) opines, it is usually the context of the process which 
determines who should participate and how. She lists different formats of participation 
such as inclusive participation at the negotiation table, observer status, consultation or 
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problem-solving workshops. These discussions, however, usually revolve on inclusion 
of warring parties, interest groups, civil society or women. The debate on inclusion of 
diasporas is a recent phenomenon in this field and there is an emerging literature on 
whether diasporas can be agents of peace (Zunzer, 2005; Baser 2015). Below, I lay out 
the recent debates in social sciences on what roles diasporas can play in peace and 
conflict and then I turn to a slightly novel discussion on diaspora engagement in 
transitional justice. I then discuss the intricacies of diaspora inclusion.  
Diasporas as Agents of Peace or Conflict? 
One way or another, diasporas become involved in contemporary homeland conflicts. 
They either directly support a group that is in conflict with the home state, or they 
whole-heartedly support the home state’s policies regarding a certain issue. Their 
support can be through financial means as well as through diplomatic and political 
interventions. Sometimes, this support can be through recruitment, training and 
supplying arms (Shain and Barth, 2003).  Previous research on diasporas and conflict 
has mainly focused on investigating the role of diasporas as radicals or hardliners who 
contribute to the prolongation of conflicts in the homeland and as less likely to 
compromise during peace processes (Lyons, 2004; Shain and Barth, 2003). Diasporas 
were described as long-distance nationalist communities pursuing radical agendas, 
while taking advantage of the freedom and economic benefits that the host land 
provided them (Anderson, 1983). It has been argued that members of the diaspora have 
contributed to the escalation of conflicts rather than supporting constructive conflict 
resolution (Zunzer, 2005). Newman and Richmond (2006, p.2) suggest that ethnic or 
national diasporas may even act as spoilers during peace processes and that “[d]iaspora 
support for the Tamil Tigers or for the IRA, or US support for Israel, not only 
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empowered these actors to resist a peaceful settlement but also allowed them to adopt 
more ambitious goals than might otherwise be expected once they did negotiate.”  
Although they have a point, as Cheran (2006, p.7) suggests, this myopic view which 
depicts diasporas as supporting violence or prolonging conflicts actually prevents 
academics from addressing diaspora contributions to peace and conflict resolution. 
Cochrane (2007, p.27) endorses this point of view by stating that positive diaspora 
contributions generate less attention than more violent interventions. The emerging 
literature indeed provides insights about diasporas as critical agents of social, political 
and cultural change in more constructive and less confrontational ways (Horst, 2007). 
Diasporas have been partly – sometimes exceedingly – effective in assisting conflict 
transformation and have been actively engaged in post-conflict reconstruction. There is 
an increasing belief that by lobbying at national and supranational levels and by aiding 
the process of transition and reconstruction, diasporas are playing an increasingly 
important role in achieving political compromise and peaceful conflict resolution in 
their homelands (Hall and Swain, 2007). They can have a positive political impact on 
peace-making through human rights advocacy, by raising awareness among the 
hostland public and decision-makers. In addition, they can potentially provide direct 
political support to pro-peace actors in the homeland, as well as participating in 
homeland peace-making initiatives as advisors (Baser and Swain, 2008). They can even 
participate in drafting constitutions in the aftermath of conflicts, as was the case with 
the Eritrean Diaspora (Antwi-Boateng, 2011, p.13). Emerging publications, therefore 
have been underlining these positive impacts more assertively and challenging the 
already existing negative light on diaspora groups.  
The financial contributions of diasporas can also be vital for post-conflict societies 
(Brinkerhoff 2011). The case of Somalia is noteworthy, as remittances are of very high 
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economic importance domestically and much of the expertise and resources for 
sustaining the ongoing peace process come from diaspora communities in the West 
(Van Hear,1998). Ambe-Uva (2011) also shows that the Tiv Diaspora in the US, 
Canada and the European Union plays a significant role in democratization and 
peacebuilding in Nigeria by sending remittances and getting involved in various types 
of development project. These financial, political or social engagements are usually 
dependent on various factors such as the host country’s political opportunity structures, 
the leverage that the diaspora has on homeland actors as well as the homeland’s 
openness to receive such influences (Baser, 2015). 
Diaspora Engagement in Transitional Justice  
Many scholars also suggest that too little attention has been given to diasporas’ roles 
in transitional justice mechanisms or in truth-seeking efforts, especially in judicial 
processes (Mey, 2008; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2016). Academics have called for the 
participation of internally displaced peoples and diasporas in truth-seeking 
mechanisms, as these processes may uncover human rights violations during the 
conflict in a more inclusive manner. As Tint et al. (2014, p. 1-2) put it, there are 
various reasons diasporas should be involved in peace and transitional justice 
mechanisms: firstly, “they share the common experience of undergoing a life-altering 
transition aggravated by the reality that it is typically stemming from adversity”, 
secondly, “they endure various degrees of loss and trauma, including separation from 
family, isolation, breakdown of community, discrimination in their new environment 
and loss of identity, status and livelihood”, thirdly, “as they resettle, their ability to 
lead successful lives is challenged by new cultures, religions, climates, educational 
systems, economic realities, employment situations, languages, and social and 
political barriers”, and finally, “they are often minorities in their adoptive countries 
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and neighbourhoods which adds a layer of difficulty they have not previously 
encountered.” Diasporas’ traumas are different than the trauma of those who stayed in 
the homeland and directly suffered the consequences of the conflict. However, 
diaspora experience, especially in exile, does not guarantee a life free of suffering. 
Some diaspora members might leave the homeland with great trauma behind them 
and great challenges ahead. Moreover, as Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016, p.25) suggests, 
engaging diasporas in transitional justice processes will provide full accounting of 
human rights violations as much as possible, and this will give diasporas a greater 
stake in homeland’s future in a post-conflict reconstruction setting. Pointing to the 
growing acceptance of a right to truth in international law, he asserts that diasporans 
have as much right to have their suffering acknowledge as those who have never left 
the country. As Orjuela (2017) argues, transitional justice is becoming more and more 
deterritorialized and turning into a global project where a variety of non-state actors 
play extensive roles. Diasporas are among those actors who can shape, reformulate or 
even drive them as diaspora members are not only activists, but in more cases also 
victims, witnesses and even perpetrators of mass atrocities (Orjuela, 2017, p.2). It is 
observable that the academic tone of the debate with regards to transitional justice is 
dominated by issues of morality as opposed to utility, unlike in the case of peace 
processes, and that the core of academic discussion revolves around victimhood and 
obligation in the perception of diasporas as part of the solution to conflicts.  
As Young and Park (2009, p.350) rightly put it “[i]t is a valid question to ask whether 
members of diaspora populations can be considered victims, as this consideration has 
great bearing on whether states have an obligation to include diaspora groups during a 
national truth commission process.” Getting diasporas involved will inevitably 
include them in claim-making processes and the right to reparation, restitution, 
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compensation, rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition (Young and Park, 2009, 
p.354). The same is true for peace processes. Are diasporas considered as the victims 
of conflict and therefore de facto stakeholders in conflict resolution processes, or are 
they considered a part of the process because they can influence political outcomes? 
The jury is still out on the answers to these questions.  As Bradley (2013, p.2) 
suggests “[i]f displaced persons are not recognized as critical stakeholders in truth-
telling processes, the narratives and recommendations that emerge from these 
initiatives will inevitably be incomplete, consigning the displaced to remain on the 
margins of their societies.” However, others might object to this by saying that they 
have not suffered as much as the locals and they should therefore be kept out of these 
sensitive processes (Shain and Aryasinha, 2006). “Armed groups, governments or the 
civil society in home countries may be reluctant to accept diasporas’ authority and 
mediation. In some cases, diaspora groups can be perceived as ‘foreigners’, already 
too distant from the hardship of the conflict to take a part in the peace settlements, or 
voice the concerns of those ‘who have stayed’ (Freitas, 2012).  Even if they return to 
the home country, they may still remain isolated, as the others will continue to 
perceive them as outsiders. Diaspora members might be perceived as having lost 
touch with the reality on the ground, as in the case of Somali diaspora (Lewela, 2012, 
p.4), or of Liberia (Antwi-Boateng, 2011, p. 20). In some cases, where active 
participation in negotiations is deemed to be impossible, some scholars such as Bala 
suggest that diasporas might not be stakeholders in peace negotiations but that they 
can still contribute to transitional justice processes by partaking in truth-seeking 
efforts even if they do not affect anything (Bala, 2015, p.33).  
As Wielbelhaus-Brahm (2016, p.25) states, “on a more ad hoc basis, in the 1980s and 
1990s, diaspora populations were able to participate in truth commissions in 
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Argentina, Chile and Guatemala through their embassies.” In recent years, some truth 
commissions have included diaspora groups either as conceivers of the process as or 
statement-givers and peace activists. This has been the case in Haiti, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and East Timor (Young and Park, 2009; Haider, 2014). These experiences, 
however, were not immune to the aforementioned challenges.  More importantly, the 
very power relations that lie at the heart of the homeland conflicts can play out in 
diaspora spaces as well when it comes to getting involved in transitional justice 
mechanisms (Orjuela, 2017, p.2).  
For instance, the Liberian Truth Commissions are an exemplary case for inclusivity of 
conflict-affected communities outside a state’s border as witnesses and victims. They 
also effectively created a platform for the debate regarding on-going trauma and 
conflict within diaspora communities (Young and Park, 2009, p.358; Dabo, 2012, p. 
9-10). The commission finalized its preparatory work between 2005 and 2006 and 
recruited and trained statement-takers who would cover not only people who lived in 
Liberia but also the diaspora. Around 20,000 statements (1,631 of them from the 
diaspora) were collected. These included the testimonies of those who live in the US, 
UK, Ghana and in other West African countries (Young and Park, 2009, p.343). 
Diaspora involvement was also present in other procedures such as report-writing and 
official public hearings. As Steinberg (2010, p.2) explains: some 600 volunteers, most 
of them corporate lawyers working pro bono, were given instruction in Liberian 
history and justice. Similarly, Hoogenboom and Quinn (2011) report that the Haitian 
diaspora in Canada played a key role in the transitional justice period in Haiti. They 
built links with the International Centre for Human rights and Democratic 
Development (ICHRDD) since they were seeking to partner with an organization that 
would enable them make their voice heard. They played a vital role in requesting truth 
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commissions and they were influential in selecting the commissioners. Although they 
provide significant variation in several dimensions, all these examples show that there 
is a strong will among diaspora communities to at least become a part of the peace 
process from afar at various levels including truth-seeking, commemoration and legal 
justice (Orjuela, 2017, p.3). There is still no systematic research that measures the 
impact of diaspora involvement on these processes and whether such involvement has 
any influence on homeland actors’ policy-making decisions.  
Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2016, p.24) argues that “the nature of violence, characteristics of 
the diaspora, and the interests of the international community are important factors 
shaping diaspora interests and influence with respect to transitional justice”. In this 
article, following his remarks, it is also claimed that willingness of homeland actors’ 
including the government and the insurgent groups’ leadership matter immensely in 
determining which diaspora group will be involved, and if so, when and how.  
 
Who to Engage? How to Engage? 
When researching ways of conceptualizing diasporas, scholars acknowledge that 
diaspora groups are not homogenous entities, and researchers therefore need to take 
into account different aspects such as ideological cleavages, class relations, gender and 
religious differences among the diaspora (Kleist, 2007; Lyons and Mandaville, 2010; 
Féron, 2017). Abdile and Pirkkalainen highlight that “even within the same diaspora, 
groups and individuals may assume different roles and may be mobilized to undertake 
contradictory responsibilities when interacting with the homeland” (Abdile and 
Pirkkalainen, 2011, p.51).  As Galipo (2011, p. 8) further argues, “there is always a 
plurality of voices within the diasporas, especially when different waves of 
displacement are taken into account. Fragmentation within diasporas often reflects the 
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social and political division in the homeland.” Based on this, divisions among different 
groups within the diaspora should also be embedded in any research that is concerned 
with diasporas’ role in conflict and peace processes (Horst, 2007, p.8). A diaspora’s 
political stance and rivalries with other groups are not static either. Scholars such as 
Kleist (2007) rightly argue that under certain circumstances, divergent groups may 
form contingent alliances for a common goal but their political, social and economic 
structures may remain fragmented.  
Involving diasporas in any phase of conflict resolution is a complex task, especially for 
third parties. At the core of the matter is the question of defining who represents the 
diaspora and, if the presence of fragmented groups within a diaspora can be detected, 
how to approach them and involve them in policy mechanisms. The diaspora group’s 
capacity and motivation to influence homeland conflict (Freitas, 2012, p. 5) is also 
immensely important in terms of determining the scope of its actions. Some groups 
may have higher motivations but lower capacities in terms of influencing peace 
outcomes, while some others might be cautious to act even though they have the ability 
to influence a peace process. Some might have negative aspirations about the conflict 
yet lack the capacity to act as spoilers, while in other cases; they have all the capacity 
but remain indifferent. Developing diaspora engagement projects will be complex for 
politicians, as well as third parties, unless these facts are considered (Horst, 2007). 
Methodology 
The article builds on in-depth interviews with Kurdish diaspora members in various 
European countries between 2008 and 2015. The interviewees were Kurdish-origin 
first and second-generation individuals who were engaged in transnational activities 
towards homeland politics which included protests, demonstrations, advocacy, justice 
and truth-seeking, lobbying and commemoration among others. The first strand of 
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research has been conducted as part of author’s doctoral thesisi between 2008 and 
2012. In this four-year period, the author conducted around 100 interviews with first 
and second-generation diaspora Kurds in Sweden and Germany, spending at least six 
months in each location. The focus of this study was how diasporas were importing 
homeland’s conflict dynamics to these European countries and what determined their 
repertoires of actions.  
The second strand of research has taken place between 2012 and 2014, while the 
author was a post-doctoral research fellow.ii This study specifically focused on how 
diasporas perceive the peace process in Turkey and what mechanisms they used in 
order to engage themselves in the process as influential actors. This study entailed 
fieldwork in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq with 2-3 week visits to each location. The author conducted around 
100 interviews by visiting Kurdish diaspora organizations, meeting other influential 
diasporans such as authors, journalists, poets and other public intellectuals.  
The last strand of research took place in Sweden in 2015 and solely focused on exile 
perceptions of peace and forgiveness from a sociological point of view. In the end 25 
testimonies were collected in five different locations in Sweden.iii Among the 
interviewees, there were activists who are now at critical roles at PKK sympathizing 
organizations in Europe, victims of torture and abuse in Turkish prisons especially 
after the 1980 coup d’etat, family members of victims who were subjected to extra-
judicial killings and forced disappearances as well as others whose relatives were/are 
members of the PKK’s armed struggle. There were also intellectuals, former 
politicians, lawyers and journalists who came to Europe as asylum seekers and are 
still living in exile.   
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In the course of these three research projects, the author has participated in diaspora 
protests, commemoration events, seminars and diaspora organizations’ annual 
gatherings. The interviews and observation materials were then anonymised in order 
to protect the identity of the informants as this is a highly sensitive issue. Although a 
significant number of interviews were recorded, a considerable number of 
interviewees avoided voice recordings, therefore the author relies of both 
transcriptions and interview notes. The data is archived in relevant university servers. 
In addition to first had data gathering, the author has also analysed content in 
traditional and social media, diaspora organizations’ leaflets and communications 
with their members. Therefore, the findings of the article are based on this extensive 
multi-sited field research which included the countries where sizeable Kurdish 
communities reside. The span of this research also contained the different stages of 
the peace process which gave the author the chance to observe each and every stage 
while on fieldwork with the possibility to comprehend the intra and inter group 
dynamics.  
 
The Kurdish Question and the Peace Process 
There has been an armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK since the 
early 1980s. For a long time, the Turkish state had a ‘no negotiation with terrorists’ 
approach and opted for a military solution (Berkowtiz and Mugge, 2014). The PKK, 
on the other hand, emphasized that it was fighting for basic human rights for Kurds, 
including freedom of expression and recognition of their ethnicity. Their argument 
was that it was state violence that had pushed them towards an armed struggle. They 
demanded that the Turkish state recognize their identity, grant educational rights in 
their mother tongue and recognize the crimes that were committed by the state.iv  
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To date, the conflict has cost some 40,000 lives and has displaced a million or more 
(Casier, Jongerden and Walker, 2013). Between 1984 and 1999, an unknown number 
of victims were also killed in ‘mystery’ killings (or disappeared). These 
disappearances have been attributed to the Turkish police, intelligence services, 
gendarmerie and village guards. Thousands of people were also internally displaced 
as a result of the deportation of the Kurdish population from some 3,000 villages 
(Jongerden, 2017). Internal migration has also accelerated Kurdish dispersal to 
Europe, as the first step of displacement that eventually caused the formation of the 
largest stateless diaspora in the world (Eccarius-Kelly, 2002).  
After the imprisonment of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the Kurdish 
movement rapidly transformed itself into an urban social movement as well as a 
political power in Kurdish regions (Gurbuz, 2016, p. 34). The movement also dropped 
the idea of a separate Kurdish state and instead adopted a strategy that foresees a 
semi-federal solution that demands the decentralization of the Turkish state. The AKP 
(Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002. Their rise to power was a 
turning point in Turkey for many reasons. Political Islam became extremely visible in 
the public realm and, at the same time, ‘taboo’ topics such as Kurdish identity and 
peace negotiations were opened to discussion. The AKP began gradually 
implementing reforms to accommodate Kurdish identity in order to align itself with 
the membership ideals of the European Union. This tactic brought electoral success to 
the AKP in the 2007 elections due to the Kurdish votes that it poached from other 
parties. This enabled the AKP to further consolidate their power (Gurbuz, 2016, p.60). 
The AKP government declared the beginning of a process of reforms on the way to a 
potential resolution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in 2009, which it called the 
‘Kurdish Opening.’ The PKK and Kurdish activists were also still questioning the 
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sincerity of the government on the route to a potential resolution and they were 
skeptical of its actions. During the rapprochement period, it was still possible to 
observe the oppression of Kurdish identity and freedom of speech. Many Kurdish 
politicians and journalists were arrested, pro-Kurdish parties were outlawed or 
criminalized, Turkish politicians constantly referred to the Kurdish movement as 
‘terrorists’ and ceasefires were violated, though on a fairly small scale. At the same 
time, the ‘peace project’ was alive and kicking and the media was paying a great deal 
of attention to the whole process.v 
In the course of the peace process, the Turkish government understood that there was 
a need for more concrete steps in order to reach a resolution to the Kurdish Question 
and the ‘Oslo Process’. In 2009, a procedure involving talks between the PKK and the 
Turkish National Intelligence agency (MIT) was launched in secret. This was later 
leaked to the public in 2011 and brought no concrete results. However, it was a sign 
that the Turkish state was now addressing the primary actor of the Kurdish movement, 
the PKK. “Between September 2008 and 2011, these reform efforts were 
accompanied by several meetings, apparently in Oslo, between high-level 
representatives from the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) and top PKK leaders [in 
exile] like Zübeyir Aydar, Sabri Ok, Remzi Kartal and Adem Uzun, with the presence 
of an international mediator” (ICG Report, 2014, p. 2). “The Oslo Process collapsed 
in 2011 and many important issues such as conditional amnesties; returns, transitional 
justice and disarmament remained unsolved” (ICG, 2014, p.3).  
In April 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan appointed 63 people as ‘wise people’ in order 
to formulate fact-finding commissions that would be responsible for different regions 
of Turkey. Within two months of observations and trips to various locations, they 
were expected to report back to the Prime Minister about their findings. This exercise 
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was kind of ‘testing the waters’ strategy, but it was tailored for testing Turkish 
sensitivities towards the process rather than, Kurdish ones. These people, who became 
part of the ‘wise people’ committees, were journalists, authors, actors, academics or 
public intellectuals who were thought to have the capacity to understand the people’s 
expectations from the peace process. Each commission wrote a report on their 
expectations. These emphasized the confusion experienced by people during the 
peace process above all else.vi The Turkish Parliament also founded a ‘Resolution 
Commission’ that included ten MPs from the ruling AKP, and one member from the 
pro-Kurdish party, which at the time was called the BDP (Peace and Democracy 
Party).vii At the end of the commission meetings, the AKP and the BDPviii published 
their own interpretations of the meetings.  
One of the topics brought back to the negotiating table most frequently was the 
question of the transitional justice mechanisms that would be put in place after a 
peaceful resolution. Pro-Kurdish politicians and civil society organizations kept 
emphasizing that “in the course of the conflict, both sides committed innumerable 
serious crimes, including murders, extrajudicial executions, torture, kidnappings and 
other human rights abuses” (ICG Report, 2014, p. 17) and therefore a transitional 
justice mechanism would be essential for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. While 
the Kurdish MPs and lawyers of the PKK leader Öcalan met him on an irregular basis, 
Öcalan also repeatedly declared that he was in favor of establishing truth commissions 
modeled on the South African example (ICG Report 2014: 20). Many civil society 
organizations such as the Human Rights Association and the Truth, Justice, Memory 
Center supported this initiative and focused on organizing seminars, demonstrations 
and archival work on the possibility of truth commissions in Turkey. A conference 
was organized in 2011 with the participation of the international community 
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comparing Turkey’s experience with other countries such as South Africa. The 
International Crisis Group’s report (2014) also suggested that although the negotiating 
parties had not yet made a public declaration, full negotiations would mean that 
Turkey and the PKK would have to eventually agree on a conditional amnesty, laws 
to smooth transitional justice, and truth commissions. It was suggested that the 
Turkish government and the PKK should agree on forming a truth commission 
composed of independent experts, which would, in the end, prepare a final report to 
be submitted to parliament. The Turkish government did not declare how it would 
implement transitional justice mechanisms, although the board and the commission on 
legal arrangements and human rights set up on October 1st 2014 had a clear mandate 
to do so’ (ICG, 2014, p. 20). 
The general decline of the peace process began around that time. Although there was 
much enthusiasm for the peace process, there was also a ‘peace process fatigue.’ As 
the process moved forward, it needed to seek more transparency, a stronger agenda 
and the comprehensive inclusion of civil society and other actors. This, however, did 
not take place. The Turkish authorities constantly reiterated that the PKK did not 
agree to disarm and that disarmament was a condition of the government’s presence at 
the peace talks. On the other hand, the PKK blamed the government for putting even 
more pressure on the Kurdish movement and not making any constitutional changes 
that guaranteed equal citizenship rights for Kurds. The peace process collapsed with 
the resurgence of armed clashes in the form of urban warfare in Kurdish cities in the 
Summer of 2015. 
The Kurdish Diaspora: An Actor or a Spectator? 
The Kurdish diaspora has always played an important role when it comes to lobbying 
host states, organizing large protests and making the Kurdish Question more visible 
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than ever in the European political scene (Berkowitz and Mugge, 2014; Baser, 2015). 
Their activities included organising petitions and campaigns, violent and non-violent 
mass demonstrations and protests, sit-ins, highway blockades, hunger strikes and even 
self-immolation. The diaspora Kurds also provided resources for the PKK including 
financial contributions, social capital and the recruitment of fighters (Eccarius-Kelly 
2002; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The size of the Kurdish community grew with 
various migration flows over the years, and today there are more than a million Kurds 
residing in Europe.ix  
Leaders of various Kurdish political movements came to Europe and formed the basis 
for a strong transnational non-state actor that would challenge Turkish domination as 
they carried the movement beyond the Turkish state’s reach and control. Many 
Kurdish activists who belonged to movements such as the PSKTx, which existed prior 
to the PKK, are still active in diaspora politics and some of them still keep their 
loyalty to these movements despite the fact that the PKK has now monopolized the 
Kurdish movement. The PSKT organized the first Kurdish worker’s association 
(KOMKAR), which still has a loyal membership (Orhan, 2016, p.54). It rejects armed 
struggle and was for a long time the “severest critic of the PKK” (Van Bruinessen, 
2000, p.4). Kemal Burkay, who until recently was an exile in Sweden, led the 
movement. After the mid-1980s, the PKK gradually became more and more active in 
the diaspora sphere as well as in the homeland, and established its domination over 
the Kurdish movement.xi It treated other Kurdish organizations as rivals and clashed 
with them either by material force or simply by recruiting from their established 
constituencies.xii  
The interviews with the Kurdish diaspora members from both groups revealed that 
they perceived themselves as both actors and as victims of the conflict, and they 
 20 
believed that their suffering continued in the diaspora. For many Kurds who fled the 
conflict in Turkey, European states offered many opportunities, including freedom of 
speech and association (Baser, 2015). They were free from oppression based 
specifically on their Kurdish ethnic identity, however they now found themselves in 
yet another setting where they faced more generalized xenophobia, discrimination and 
statelessness. Their victimhood did not disappear; it simply took another form in the 
diaspora (See Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). 
While the Kurdish diaspora was getting mobilized for the struggle in the homeland, 
European countries started banning Kurdish organizations one-by-one as a result of 
the PKK’s tactics abroad such as blocking highways, invading embassies or 
conducting violent demonstrations. Another reason for banning Kurdish organisations 
was the extreme diplomatic pressure that European countries received from Turkey. 
Germany banned the PKK in 1993 and the European Union placed the organization 
on a list of terrorist organizations in 2002. These developments quickly brought about 
the criminalization of the movement, and concurrently, the diaspora activities 
surrounding it (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Organizations were banned, funding 
opportunities were cut, and active members of the community were put under 
surveillance. The PKK cadre in Europe was put on INTERPOL’s wanted list for 
narcotics trafficking (ICG Report, 2014, p. 2) and other crimes. Due to pressure from 
Turkey, Kurdish TV channels were banned, Kurdish-language education in countries 
such as Germany was rejected by the local Turkish diaspora, and inter-communal 
violence erupted between Turkish and Kurdish communities in many countries in 
Europe. As observable in other cases, historical grievances travel with community 
members into the diaspora and they affect resettlement efforts and cohesion within the 
diaspora (Tint et al., 2014, p. 1-2).  
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Turkey also requested the deportation of PKK sympathizers, and this caused 
tremendous insecurity among diaspora members. One of the interviewees, who was 
on INTERPOL’s wanted list, claimed that he cannot travel outside the Netherlands 
and he was under surveillance of homeland and hostland security authorities.xiii Most 
of them did not have the chance to acquire citizenship in countries where 
naturalization laws are strict. As asylum seekers, they also had no hope of returning to 
their home country. If they were to return, some would be subject to arrest for 
political crimes. For instance, one interviewee mentioned that although he acquired 
Swedish citizenship and renounced his Turkish one, he visited Turkey after 20 years 
of being in exile and he was arrested and then deported back to Sweden without any 
explanation.xiv For many, therefore, peaceful resolution to the conflict carried with it 
the possibility of having criminal charges against them dropped in the homeland and, 
eventually, the promise of return. This double criminalization both in home and host 
countries, the state of limbo and feelings of insecurity contributed to developing 
attachments towards the homeland, maintaining an interest in the homeland conflict, 
and at the same time feeling the constant need to become involved in conflict 
resolution.  
Many interviewees have suffered torture and other human rights violations in Turkey. 
Their villages were burnt by the Turkish armed forces, they were deported from their 
towns, their family members disappeared or were subjected to extra-judicial killings. 
Some are deprived of citizenship. These traumatic experiences also left a sense of 
having ‘unfinished business’, and those affected constantly waited for closure. These 
traumas were inherited by subsequent generations and become a part of the diasporic 
memory. Second generation Kurds suffered from the spillover effects of the conflict 
back in the homeland. Therefore, the question was not whether the diaspora had an 
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emotional motivation to get involved, but how they would manage to partake in this 
process as an actor rather than as a spectator.  
Complexities of Engaging the Kurdish Diaspora(s) 
Pre-Talks Phase: Factionalism in the Diaspora Unfolds 
The ‘Kurdish opening’ launched in 2009 paved the way for the discussion of several 
issues previously considered taboo in Turkey. However, it fell short of engaging with 
the demands of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. There were conflicting views about 
these developments in Kurdish diaspora circles, revealing the fragmentation and 
competing narratives within the diaspora. There was an especially visible rivalry for 
the domination of diasporic spaces between the two main groups within the Kurdish 
diaspora: the PKK-led organizations and KOMKAR. Relations between these two 
groupings “never became cordial” (Van Bruinessen, 2000, p.5).  
The author observed that at the end of the 2000s, KOMKAR made constant 
declarations of support for the process, while PKK-related organisations were more 
cautious and less optimistic in their comments. Around this time, state-related bodies 
were tailoring strategies to broaden the scope of their initiatives to include the 
diaspora. Initially the AKP government did not want to engage in an official dialogue 
with the PKK or with its diaspora organisations. They aimed at reaching the Kurdish 
population at home and abroad by bypassing the PKK. The representative of 
KOMKAR Berlin, for instance, stated that their organization, despite being 
criminalized by the Turkish state for many years, were visited by Turkish officials, 
journalists and other public figures for potential talks on cooperation.xv For a PKK-
sympathising diaspora member, this was a clear sign that KOMKAR was 
collaborating with the Turkish state, preparing the end of the PKK. For him, this was 
“just another divide and rule strategy” played by Turkey.xvi 
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As Galipo argues, sometimes divisions within the diaspora are counterproductive to 
positive outcomes due to a lack of joint efforts, and intra-group rivalries may act as a 
barrier to a more durable solution (Galipo, 2011, p.19). In this process, there was 
neither any cooperation between the two Kurdish actors, nor any initiative from 
homeland actors to unite them. For the PKK, the AKP was seen as a threat with 
regards to its constituency, but for KOMKAR, sympathising with the Kurdish elite, 
the AKP was erasing a militarist legacy and it might enhance opportunities for them 
to outbid the PKK. Freitas argues that, “the potential existence of internal competition 
for resources and leadership among different groups may also eventually contribute to 
the weakening of diasporas’ positions altogether” (Freitas, 2012) and it seems like this 
was the case for the Kurdish diasporas. Rival groups were used against each other and 
could not establish a common stance. 
In order to start cooperating with the Kurdish diaspora, the AKP government and 
AKP sympathizing diaspora organizations took several steps such as the opening of a 
dialogue with Kemal Burkay to secure his return to Turkey from exile. AKP 
politicians also met one of the most influential Kurdish singers, Siwan Perwer, who 
had long been in exile, and convinced him to return to Turkey. He was a prominent 
figure in the Kurdish movement whose songs encouraged many young Kurds to join 
the resistance movement. Perwer returned to Turkey and joined AKP rallies and 
election campaigns. This caused uproar among PKK-sympathizing circles, as Perwer 
was seen to be ‘selling-out’. During my interview with Perwer, he also confirmed that 
he was receiving threatening messages for his cooperation with Turkish state 
authorities.xvii AKP-led diaspora organizations such as the UETD organized talks with 
KOMKAR between 2009 and 2011 in order to discuss further collaboration.xviii 
KOMKAR leaders also made a press declaration stating that they recognize the value 
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of the AKP’s reforms. For the KOMKAR leadership, the demands of the Kurds could 
have been restored by democratic struggle, and there was therefore no need for an 
armed struggle. Although they were not in complete agreement with the government, 
they wanted an end to violence on both sides.xix While the Turkish government tried 
to bypass the PKK and its affiliated organisations at the beginning of the ‘Kurdish 
opening’, KOMKAR and its affiliated organisations saw this as a window of 
opportunity to put the HAK-PAR, the political party affiliated with PSKT and 
KOMKAR, back on the political scene in Turkey. KOMKAR organised several 
meetings in Europe with Turkish political actors in order to discuss the current state of 
affairs in Turkey and launched a reactivation of HAK-PAR.xx Their approach to the 
new developments was almost always a mirror image of what the PKK was 
advocating.   
While this power struggle was taking place for the domination of diaspora spaces, the 
Turkish state initiated secret talks with the PKK. This is because approaching rival 
Kurdish movements and Kurdish public figures that were critical of the PKK did not 
bring any mass support to PKK’s rivals. Moreover, this strategy was unable to 
challenge the biggest Kurdish movement in Turkey. Groups such as KOMKAR might 
have survived in the diaspora but they had no real support base in Turkey, especially 
from the Kurdish youth. When this information about the talks became public, the 
PKK’s rivals felt sidelined within this new process and organized a conference in 
Duisburg, Germany, in April 2013 to declare that although they had a positive 
approach towards the peace process, they were unhappy with the lack of 
transparency.xxi From 2011, these groups were not even visible during the peace 
process.  
The Peace Process: Unconditional Support Intertwined with Skepticism 
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During the peace talks, the imprisoned PKK leader communicated his message via his 
lawyers or through members of parliament. He sent three letters to communicate his 
position: one letter to the pro-Kurdish political party, one letter to PKK headquarters 
in the Qandil Mountains, and one letter to the diaspora. It was very important that he 
acknowledged the diaspora as an actor in this process. He asked for the organization 
of a ‘Peace Conference’ by the Kurdish diaspora in Brussels, which was subsequently 
held in Summer 2013. Many Kurdish diaspora organizations as well as Turkish leftist, 
Armenian, and Assyrian organisations participated in the conference. They published 
a declaration which focused on issues such as demanding equal rights, criticizing 
Turkey for its foreign policy, asking European states to terminate arms deals with 
Turkey, establishing committees for reconciliation and coming to terms with the past, 
sharing the ideals Gezi protests, returning constitutional rights to the Kurds and 
drafting a new constitution that fully erases the legacy of the 1982 constitution. The 
conference committee agreed that they should establish sub-committees that would be 
responsible for different specific questions while they were giving support to the 
peace process in Turkey. These sub-committees were: Truth, Reconciliation and 
Justice; Women and Youth; PR; Law; Road Map and New Constitution; and 
European Affairs. There was a strong emphasis on the need to establish truth 
commissions in Turkey and to make sure that other mechanisms of transitional justice 
put in place enabled Turkey to face its past. This was particularly significant for the 
many Kurds who had been brutally assaulted by the Turkish state and who sought 
closure. One of the sub-committee’s statements was as follows: 
 
As the participants of this conference, we perceive ourselves as 
components of the peace and democracy process. We do not limit 
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our duty to solely following the negotiation process, we declare to 
the public that we will be an active intervening party in the process 
and we are working towards socialization of the peace and 
democracy process, involving other communities in this struggle 
besides the components of this conference, informing public in 
Europe and contributing to durable peace.xxii 
 
The conference was important for a variety of reasons: it showed that (i) diaspora 
members kept their attachments to and interest in homeland politics, (ii) the diaspora 
wanted to be part of the peace process, (iii) the diaspora elite synchronized their 
discourses with the homeland actors, (iv) the diaspora elite cared about the hostland 
dimension of politics and wanted to act as a bridge between the homeland and 
hostland and most importantly, (v) the diaspora is not a spoiler but rather a supporter 
of the peace process. In peace processes, actors who are not satisfied with the terms of 
an agreement or other developments in the course of peace negotiations will engage in 
disruptive behaviour unless their demands are met (Stedman, 1997; Newman and 
Richmond, 2006). In the Kurdish case, however, this overt wrecking behaviour from 
different factions within the diaspora is not in evidence, if anything “the diaspora was 
careful not to do anything that might negatively influence it” (Democratic Progress 
Institute Report, 2013, p. 10).  
What was critical about this conference was that despite the fact that it was highly 
inclusive of other non-Kurdish groups who have a pro-Kurdish stance, it was 
exclusive toward other pro-Kurdish groups that were rivals of the PKK. Both groups 
supported the peace process and constantly struggled to become a part of it. Although 
their interpretation of ‘peace’ might have significant overlaps, it was clear that their 
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roadmap to achieve this goal varied immensely. Therefore, it is possible to detect two 
“competing forms of engagement” (Lewela, 2012, p.3). There was an asymmetric 
relationship between the two: The PKK had both the capacity and motivation as 
mentioned by Freitas (2012), while KOMKAR had the motivation but lacked the 
capacity to influence the course of events in the homeland. When trying to engage 
diaspora groups in homeland-related issues from peace-building to development, a 
common ground needs to be found in order to unify diaspora efforts (Horst, 2007). 
The inclusion of diaspora groups in this important process was conducted in an 
arbitrary, disordered way. An interviewee, who was the former head of the largest 
Kurdish diaspora which has no links to neither to the PKK nor KOMKAR, stated that 
“I have given my life to this struggle… 30 years spent working for peace and now I 
cannot find a single channel to make my voice heard.”xxiii Therefore, other figures in 
the diaspora who remained distanced to mainstream organizations but mobilized for 
the Kurdish cause outside these circles were also sidelined by both homeland and 
diaspora actors. PKK-sympathising interviewees, however, had a different take on the 
negotiations. One interviewee who was a spokesperson for a Kurdish organization in 
the Netherlands said that he has full support for the PKK during the negotiations and 
continued “we don’t have to know everything. The PKK knows that they are 
doing.”xxiv Another interviewee, who is a Kurdish activist and singer in Sweden also 
said “the PKK has our proxy for negotiations”. According to her, the diaspora should 
support the process but stay aside and let the PKK dominate the process.xxv 
The Kurdish diaspora is one of the most vocal diasporas in the world. It possesses 
considerable expertise on transnational advocacy, as the movement itself stems from a 
politics of resistance. When it came to getting actively involved in a peace process, 
the diaspora’s role was secondary. Throughout the process, the Turkish government 
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addressed the diaspora groups interchangeably and at different times, all the while 
playing them off one against another and increasing its own leverage throughout the 
negotiations. In addition to this, both PKK-aligned organisations and KOMKAR tried 
to side-line each other during this process rather than trying to collaborate in order to 
find a common basis from which they could push the Turkish government towards 
reform. No group, however, had the capacity for spoiling or derailing the peace 
process in the diaspora and neither group had this intention. The Democratic Progress 
Institute’s research (Democratic Progress Institute Report, 2013) on the diaspora elite 
also confirms author’s observations in the sense that Kurdish diaspora members were 
not more radical than the homeland actors and actually gave their full support to 
homeland decisions. The diaspora elite seemed to be a supporting component of the 
process despite their hesitations. Many Kurdish exiles not identifying themselves with 
either group also declared that they were in agreement with the aims of the peace 
process. This support was not for the AKP’s own agenda within the process, but for 
the ideal of putting an end to the conflict. Many were still critical of the government, 
the content of the peace process, the lack of incentives offered by the Turkish state, 
however, there was no major opposition to the idea of negotiation itself.  
 
Where is Justice? Diaspora Demands Truth Commissions 
As Budak (2015) argues, the human rights dimension of the conflict not only includes 
political and cultural rights but also the right to truth and reparations, which can only 
be provided by transitional justice mechanisms. Previous studies showed that “limited 
and strategic acts by the Turkish state to address past wrongs did not actually paved 
the way for a comprehensive coming to terms with the past process so far (Bakiner, 
2013). As mentioned above, various NGOs and civil society organizations have 
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already started creating momentum to contribute to Kurdish truth-seeking efforts. 
These activities includes repeated demands such as prosecution of perpetrators, 
acknowledgement and public recognition of human rights violations, an official 
apology and then compensation (Budak, 2015,p.12). Kurdish civil society groups as 
well as the diaspora organizations have mobilized around those issues and made their 
demands quite visible in the international arena. Although Turkey has taken small 
steps, especially considering EU conditionality, most of these demands were not 
addressed in a systematic manner. As Jongerden (2017, p.2) claims, the state in 
Turkey applied a transitional justice approach to the Kurdish issue which dealt with 
compensation of damage as an individualized transaction.xxvi Focusing particularly on 
how the state handled the legacy of forced migration and village evacuations from the 
1990s, he further claims that the state whitewashed its hands from further 
responsibility by turning victims of the state into debtors to the state. During the peace 
process, there was no discussion of a comprehensive view of restorative, reparative 
and retributive justice and these issues were not integral to the peace process (Budak, 
2015, p.13).  
Although it was highly demanded by civil society and other Kurdish organizations as 
well as the pro-Kurdish political parties in the parliament, a truth commission in 
Turkey has not been materialized. As Budak (2017,p.12) opines, a truth commission 
vested with sufficient power and resources to carry out impartial investigations of 
human rights violations would be the key for a peaceful resolution in Turkey. As 
these demands mentioned above were not met in the slightest, the Kurdish population 
in Turkey then formulated a “do-it-yourself” approach for dealing with injustices 
(Jongerden, 2017, p.3), and formulated their own protest and commemoration 
mechanisms to keep truth and justice-seeking efforts alive. As they think that justice 
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has not been sufficiently pursued and achieved, various individuals from the 
homeland and the diaspora started suing Turkey to the ECtHR. This is actually a 
common practice among exiles who pursue their cases in foreign courts when they are 
disappointed in the justice mechanisms of the home country (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 
2016, p.28). Pushing for jusice through universal jurisdiction is used by diasora 
groups from Chile, Argentina and Rwanda among others (Haider, 2014, p.8). A 
Kurdish diaspora activist from the UK, Kerim Yildiz, has even prepared a manual for 
“Taking Cases to the European Court of Human Rights”, which acted as a guide for 
Kurdish individuals to take the human rights violations against them to courts outside 
Turkey. These cases “have highlighted the human dimensions of mass atrocities and 
resemble the work of a truth commission” (Budak, 2015, p.13).  
However, most of the justice-seeking initiatives were usually confined to Turkish 
borders, leaving diaspora testimonies out of the picture for the time being. In other 
words, local Kurds’ justice-demands were most of the time picked up by the diaspora 
and were transnationalized via advocacy, commemoration and protest; while diaspora 
Kurds’ demands in return got lost in the cacophony of numerous efforts or due to 
other issues that were prioritized over them. The establishment of a truth commission 
was one of the most desired outcomes of the negotiations, stated by the interviewees. 
Diaspora elites regularly commented on this and insisted that they wanted to actively 
get involved in order to contribute to transitional justice. Especially my interviewees 
from Germany and Sweden, repeatedly mentioned that they want to testify in courts 
and face the perpetrators who tortured them, burned their village or caused their 
family members’ disappearance. Among the interviewees, there were also complaints 
that the lack of transparency and inclusion in the peace process might also reflect on 
the transitional justice mechanisms that would be put forward at a later stage. Some 
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communicated their concerns that because they were not members of organizations 
that are known to support the PKK, they will not be included in the process albeit they 
have been active in pro-Kurdish diaspora mobilization for decades. An interviewee 
from Sweden mentioned that “the PKK will not be happy to our side of the story”.xxvii 
Another Kurdish activist from France, whose brother was murdered by the PKK in 
Paris in 1987, stated that he has no trust in a truth commission that is led by the 
Turkish-state and the PKK only, because intra-group injustices will not come to the 
fore.xxviii As many other interviewees, he deemed international support and 
involvement essential for a credible process. 
As mentioned above, politicians and civil society organizations also made references 
to the need to consider the return of exiles to Turkey. Nonetheless, no specific policies 
were formulated in this regard. Although it was acknowledged that diaspora members 
were victims of this conflict, their agency was not recognized as vital for the process. 
The center of peace process discussions was in turkey and their travel there to 
participate in rallies, seminars or other means of debates were limited due to their 
arrest warrants. Therefore, they were expected to be passive recipients to the policies 
that would be formulated in the homeland. Legal modifications were needed in order 
to formulate policies of return, to drop pending trials and accusations, to regulate 
compensation/reparations, to give a say to the diaspora in the outcome of negotiations, 
and to facilitate their involvement in truth commissions. However, at the end of a 
decades-long protracted conflict, the homeland actors had a certain set of priorities 
and the diaspora’s active involvement was not high on the agenda.  
 
Hurdles in Front of Diaspora’s Peace and Justice-Seeking Efforts 
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One of the pitfalls of this process was that most of the attention was focused on elites, 
and there were no bottom-up initiatives to measure the perceptions of diaspora 
members who did not hold key positions. During the peace process, numerous surveys 
were conducted in Turkey in order to measure both Turkish and Kurdish expectations 
about the process. None of these surveys included the diaspora. It was only possible to 
see how Kurdish diaspora members were thinking collectively about the peace 
process during mass demonstrations with the participation of thousands chanting 
slogans demanding peace. Considering that long-term peacebuilding measures should 
also include the diaspora – as a consequence of the conflict having become 
transnational – policymakers should have taken into account that peace and 
reconciliation is also needed amongst Turkish and Kurdish diaspora communities. An 
inclusive peacebuilding mechanism might also consider mapping reconciliation 
strategies for diasporas in each specific host country, as they have created 
autonomous diasporic spaces over time (Féron, 2017).  
Additionally, none of the ‘wise people’ commissions were sent to the diaspora. The 
only recognition of diaspora issues by the ‘wise people’ commissions, was the 
observation that some regulations would need to be put in place to facilitate the return 
of exiles.xxix Other discursive references appeared in parliamentary commission 
reportsxxx and political speeches. At one of the meetings organized by the 
parliamentary commission, it was even suggested that the return of exiles should be 
prioritized over the disarmament of PKK fighters as this might mitigate the situation 
and prepare the ground for potential next steps.xxxi The BDP’s alternative report also 
suggested that issue of return and its legal implications should be discussed.xxxii The 
International Crisis Group (2012, p.18-19) dedicated a section of their report to 
examining diaspora support to the PKK. However, its primary focus was the question 
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of security and terrorist-financing, rather than the inclusivity of the peace process or 
whether transitional justice mechanisms would include Kurdish migrants who reside 
in Europe. However, it did state that the diaspora could play a significant role in 
reconciliation, as first-generation migrants in particular are receptive to the idea of 
return. The report also urged the Turkish government to draw major pro-peace 
diaspora leaders into the negotiations.  Despite these broad references to the internally 
displaced and exiled, there was no concrete agenda that suggested tailoring specific 
policies for them.  
Another drawback of this experience was that there was no sufficient third-party 
support for facilitating diaspora engagement in the process. As shown above, in the 
case of Liberia, Haiti and Zimbabwe, it was third-party think tanks, civil society 
organizations or even host states that started certain initiatives to at least provide a 
platform for diasporas to make their voices heard. In this case, there was no durable 
mechanism which could transmit the message from the diaspora to the homeland 
actors. This might make things harder for the diaspora, especially when there remains 
a potential for truth commissions in Turkey in the future. As the Liberian case shows, 
the inclusion of diasporas to transitional justice mechanisms is a costly effort and 
homeland actors should be ready to shoulder this burden. The Kurdish diaspora could 
have acted in a more strategic way to better engage with host states in order to 
increase their leverage. However, as third parties also consider group motivation and 
capacity (Vorrath, 2012, p.5), a united umbrella organization free from the internecine 
politics of Kurdish diaspora factions could have been much more attractive. Third 
parties might get confused about whom to approach when the diaspora community is 
divided along ideological lines (Horst et.al., 2010). If diasporas are too politicized or 
criminalized, this might also lead to the decisions not to engage (Horst et.al., 2010, 
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p.22; Vorrath, 2012, p.25). Since the PKK-sympathizing diaspora might deter various 
third parties from engagement, an overarching transitional association with a fresh 
outlook solely focusing on peace and reconciliation, and on questions of transitional 
justice could be very useful. It would also eliminate the competing agendas for 
advocacy from rival Kurdish diaspora groups. 
 
Conclusion 
Until very recently, the general approach to diasporas was to either ignore their 
impact entirely, or express skepticism about their power and capacity. Currently, the 
trend is changing towards including them in every single phase of conflict resolution, 
management and transformation. However, as the examples above show, this 
inclusion usually remains at the discursive level. Whilst these new trends have 
brought about the acknowledgement that diasporas do matter, we still do not know the 
true scope and limitations of their actions and the difficulties and peculiarities of 
engaging them in certain phases of conflicts. Previous studies were occupied with 
diasporas’ emotional attachments to their homelands, and contemporary studies are 
occupied with diaspora agency and utility. When it comes to post-conflict phases, we 
need to formulate a holistic approach to peace and reconciliation that is more 
comprehensive and puts the conflict in a historical and transnational perspective. 
The Kurdish case demonstrates that diasporas often show an interest in conflict 
resolution in their homeland because it is the very reason they are outside the borders 
of their homeland in the first place. They also want to get involved in transitional 
justice mechanisms, as these would give them some sense of justice and closure. 
However, their participation is not immune to challenges, because it is not devoid of 
internal politics and power relations. Although homeland actors acknowledged the 
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presence of the diaspora and sought support from it, they did not reflect the needs of 
the diaspora systematically in their policy formulations. The diaspora was asked to be 
present, but was relegated to a complementary role rather than that of an active 
playmaker. Diaspora participation also mostly took place at the elite level. A novel 
and comprehensive approach is needed in order to reveal the diverse expectations 
about the peace process, which included diaspora narratives of suffering and exile 
distinct from those of their compatriots in the homeland.  
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